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1. Introduction
The impact on the economies of the oil importing nations of the late
1973 oil price increase and its consequent international payment
imbalances has been the subject of a great deal of research.1 But
relatively little emphasis has been placed on the severe problems that
the resulting capital inflows have created for the economies of
oil-exporting countries. Most of these countries have experienced severe
inflation and economic disparities since 1974. The neglect of this area
of research is rather unfortunate, as a better understanding of the role
of oil revenues on the domestic economy of these countries can provide
useful guidelines for better management of these economies and as a
result provide more stability in the world oil market.
In this paper our objective is to analyze the role of oil revenue in
the determination and the controlability of money supply in Iran. In
particular we will pursue the double objectives of analyzing the degree
to which the Central Bank has been able to influence the determination of
money supply and the types of monetary instruments used in its effort to
control money supply. Since the oil revenue is paid in terms of foreign
currency and directly accrues to the government, it affects both the
government budget and the balance of payments. Viewed from the point of
view of money supply determination, the oil revenue affects the domestic
and external component of monetary base adversely. Any change in oil
revenue will change the foreign reserves holdings of the Central Bank and
at the same time, given the level of government expenditure, will affect
the claims of the Central Bank on the government. This dual feature of
3oil revenue in Iran, seems to us to be a key element in understanding the
mechanism of the money base determination and hence has constituted the
core of our theoretical analysis.2
The study is set out in four sections. In the next section a
theoretical model is presented within which the various factors
influencing the growth of money supply are analyzed. By integrating the
balance-of-payments constraint and the government budget constraint, an
equation is derived which explains the change in monetary base as a
function of oil revenue and government expenditure. Section Three
contains the empirical analysis. First it presents quantitative
information on the sources of growth of money supply in Iran for the
period 1961-1974; secondly, it presents some regression results on the
determinants of money base, and thirdly, it discusses the issue of
sterilization policy in Iran and tries to separate the part of
sterilization which has been automatic due to the nature of oil revenue
from the part which has been due to the conscious actions of the Central
Bank. Section Four concludes the paper with a brief summary and some
important conclusions.
2. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. The Monetary Base and Its Determinants. The monetary base is
broadly defined as the net monetary liability of the government to the
banks and non-bank public. It, therefore, consists of currency in
circulation and the legal and sight deposits of the banks with the
Central Bank.3 More specifically the monetary base can be derived by
consolidating the balance sheets of the government and the Central Bank.
4From the liability side of this consolidated balance sheet one can obtain
an equation describing the use of monetary base, B, as:
B = CRP + LRB + ERB (1)
where CRP = currency in the hands of the public,
LRB = the legal reserve of the banks and ERB represents
their excess reserves.
Correspondingly, from the asset side of the consolidated balance and
by a proper rearrangement of some of the items we obtain an equation
describing the sources of monetary base:
B = FRC + GNAC + BAC + EAC (2)
where FRC = foreign assets held by the Central Bank less the loans and
credits received from abroad,
GNAC = claims on the government less the government deposits with
the Central Bank,
BAC = Central Bank's advance and rediscounts to the banks,
EAC = a term containing other items on the asset side less the
import registration deposits of the private sector,
contingent liabilities, and others.
A more detailed analysis of the Central Bank's balance sheet is
presented in Appendix 2. However, it is important to note here that the
items of the balance sheet have been rearranged in such a way that the
source components reflect the main separate mechanism of the supply of
the monetary base. In this regard it is important to distinguish between
the external sources, determined by the conditions in the balance of
payments and the internal sources which depend on the government's
budgetary position and the banks borrowing from the Central Bank.
5The external source component of the monetary base can be identified
with the net Central Bank's foreign asset holdings, FRC, which consists
mainly of the holdings of foreign currencies, the special drawing right
and the gold trading position with the IMF, the subscription and shares
to international agencies, and the stock of official gold. Changes in
the foreign assets of the Central Bank depend essentially on the
evolution of the balance of payments and reflect the transactions in both
the current and capital accounts. Under the system of fixed (or pegged)
exchange rates the balance of payments acts as a constraint on the supply
of monetary base. The exact way in which the situation in the balance of
payments affects the changes in the foreign assets of the Central Bank is
described in equation (3).
AFRC = CAB +A(FLB - FAB) +A(FLG - FAG) (3)
where CAB denotes the current account balance, (FLB - FAB) represents the
net foreign liability of the banks, (FLG - FAG) is equal to the net
foreign government debt and Ais the difference operator defined as
Axt = (Xt+l - Xt).
It is important to note that embedded in our representation of the
balance-of-payments constraint in equation (3) is the assumption that the
non-bank public in Iran does not hold foreign assets or incur foreign
liabilities. Especially it is assumed that the private corporations do
not issue securities or bonds to foreigners. This assumption is indeed
justifiable in the case of Iran where the capital markets are not fully
developed nor integrated with the foreign markets.
6The balance on current account, CAB, is equal to the total exports
of goods and services minus the imports of goods and services. In the
Iranian situation where oil is the major export and due to the
predominant influence of oil revenue on the national income determination
and consequently the level of imports, it is assumed that:
CAB = OR + 3 (4)
where OR denotes the oil revenue and and are constant parameters.
The internal source component of the monetary base can in turn be
identified with the government debt to the Central Bank, GNAC, and the
banks borrowing from the Central Bank, BAC. The changes in net claims on
the government depend mainly on government current budget deficit and the
manner in which the deficit is financed. In the case of Iran where the
public participation in the government bond market is insignificant, the
government deficit has to be financed mainly by increases in the
government debt with the Central Bank, GNAC, and by placing government
securities either abroad (FLG - FAG) or with the banks (BLG - BAG), that is:
GDF = A GNAC + A (FLG - FAG) + A (BLG - BAG) (5)
where GDF denotes government deficit.
In equation (6) we express the amount of government securities
purchased by banks as a linear function of government deficit, that is:
A (GLB - GAB) = GDF + a (6)
7Government deficit itself is equal to government expenditure, GEXP, minus
government revenue, where government revenue is composed of oil revenue,
OR, and non-oil revenue, NOR.
GDF = GEXP - OR - NOR (7)
To see more precisely how the oil revenue affects the monetary base
in Iran, we must first define the adjusted monetary base, BA, according
to the following equation.
BA = B - (FLB - FAB) - BAC - EAC (8)
It is important to note that, according to equation (8), BA is
defined to consist only of those components of the monetary base which
are not influenced by the behavior of the banks.
By substituting for B from equation (2) we obtain a new expression
for the adjusted monetary base which is,
BA = FRC + GNAC - (FLB - FAB) (9)
By applying the difference operator A to the both sides of equation
(9) and then by substituting for FRC and GNAC from equations (5) and (3)
and by means of the equation (4), (6) and (7) we obtain an equation
whichexpresses the change in the adjusted monetary base as a function of
oil revenue and government expidenture. The result is equation (10).
A BA = ( X - (1 - )) OR + (1 - ) (GEXP - NOR) + - a (10)
8It follows from equation (10) that the way that the oil revenue
affects the change in the adjusted monetary base depends on two
parameters and . In the case that > (1 - ) then the oil
revenue has a positive influence on the change in the monetary base,
otherwise it has a negative influence.
2.2. The Money Supply Function. The second step in our analysis
requires the specification of a multiplier function to relate the stock
of money to the monetary base. For this purpose a narrow definition of
money is adopted, namely:
M = CRP + DD (11)
where M denotes money stock, CRP the currency in circulation outside the
banking sector and DD the demand deposits.
Recent research by Metzler and Brunner2 has emphasized the point
of view that the determination of the multiplier function should be
viewed as the outcome of the optimization behavior of the public and
banking sector on one hand, and the monetary authorities on the other
hand, under the various constraints imposed upon them. The behavior of
the public can be described by a set of equations determining the
allocation of its total financial assets among a set of competing
assets. Given the fact that in Iran the public holdings of government
bonds are insignificant and that trade in any further type of securities
is not considered here, the public portfolio behavior can be described as
9allocating its financial assets between currency (CRP), demand deposits
(DD), and saving and time deposits (SD). In this context two ratios are
defined to express the public portfolio behavior, they are:
C CRP (12)
M
SD (13)
DD
where C and S are respectively the ratio of currency to money supply and
saving deposits to demand deposits.
In the same fashion the behavior of the banking system can be
described by means of two ratios expressing their legal and excess
reserve positions. That is,
LRB (14)
RR = (DD + SD + GD)
RE ( ERB (15)
RE (DD + SD + GD)
where RR and RE are the legal and excess reserve ratios respectively and
GD is the government deposits with the banks. Furthermore GD can be
related to DD by means of the following ratio:
G - GD (16)
DD
where G is the ratio of government deposits to the public's demand
deposits.
Substituting (13) and (16) into (14) and (15) yields:
LRB = RR ( 1 + S + G ) DD (14.a)
LER = RE ( 1 + S + G ) DD (15.a)
10
Again substituting (14.a) and (15.a) in (1.a) yields:
B = CRP + (RR + RE) (1 + S + G) DD (17)
By dividing both sides of (17) by M and substituting for DD/M from
equations (12) and finally solving it for M yields:
M =m( .) B
where m=C + (RR + RE)(1 S+G) (1 + S + G - C) (18)
is the monetary multiplier.
Finally by taking the natural logarithm of (18) and differentiating
with respect to time, we obtain an equation expressing the growth rate of
money as a function of growth rate of monetary base and the rates of
change of monetary ratios. That is:
M '
M = - (1 - (RR + RE)) (1 + S + G) d- (1 + S + G) (1 - C)
dRR dRE dSdR - (1 + S + G) (1 - C) dR - (RR + RE (1 - C) dt - (RR + RE)
dG(1 - C) d (19)
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3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1. The Sources of Growth of Money Stock. Table 1 displays the
annual percentage rate of growth of money stock and money base in
addition to the annual percentage change of monetary ratios for the period
1962-1975. An interesting feature of this table is the increasing trend
observed in the growth rate of money stock, especially after 1971. While
the average annual growth rate was about 10.4 percent over the period
1962-1970, it sharply rose to about 36.2 percent for the period
1971-1975. The growth of money stock reaches its peak of 61.4 percent in
1974. This is clearly the result of the phenomenal oil price increase of
October 1973 which gave the Iranian economy its unprecedented boom.
Equally interesting is the observation that the growth of monetary
base closely follows the growth of money supply. The closeness of this
relationship is striking as it can be revealed by the correlation
coefficient of .933 between the two growth rates. This indeed is an
interesting finding as it can be used as a basis for projecting the
growth of money supply from the knowledge of the growth of the monetary
base. However, before pursuing this issue it is essential to have some
quantitative knowledge about the contribution of other determinants of
money stock. This knowledge is provided in Table 2 where it reports the
absolute and relative contributions of the average rates of change of
monetary base and the monetary ratios to the average rate of change of
money stock for different time periods. The relative contributions are
derived by dividing the absolute contributions by the average growth rate
of money stock.
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Table 1
The Annual Rate of Growth of Money Supply and
Money Base, and the Annual Change of Monetary Ratios
(1962-1975)
B
6.8
11.9
1.6
18.5
9.0
13.5
20.5
13.3
19.0
20.8
31.7
33.0
65.4
33.9
C
2.4
.9
-2.0
-2.0
-1.1
-1.1
-1.2
2.3
0.9
0.4
-0.5
0.8
-2.3
0.8
S
32.0
20.1
5.7
0.7
7.3
8.3
18.8
52.4
28.4
20.9
-4.9
8.5
-12.7
7.9
RR
-3.2
-0.5
0.0
3.2
0.0
-0.6
1.4
0.1
2.6
-1.1
-0.2
1.5
-0.8
0.3
RE G
-3.5
-2.3
-3.9
-0.1
-0.9
-0.3
0.4
-0.6
-0.5
-0.7
-0.2
0.1
1.6
-1.3
0.5
7.0
-0.9
7.7
0.3
-1.7
-5.4
14.0
2.3
19.8
-10.8
-6.8
14.7
-2.2
Coments: The annual changes in the monetary ratios have been calculated
by the formula:
t = (Xt - Xt - 1) * 100
Source: Annual Report of the Central Bank of Iran, various years.
Year
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
M
9.7
11.8
10.0
11.8
10.7
15.4
14.0
2.8
7.7
20.1
35.6
27.7
61.4
36.4
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An examination of the observations contained in Table 2 reveals some
interesting features of the Iranian monetary system. To begin with, one
is immediately struck by the predominant contribution of the monetary
base to the growth rate of the Iranian money stock during the period
1961-1975.5 An idea of the relative significance of the monetary base
in the determination of the money stock can be gained on the basis of the
observation that the growth of monetary base accounts on average for
about 188 percent of the growth of money stock during the period
1961-1975. Also, the observation that the growth rate of monetary base
exceeds that of money stock over most of the time periods under
consideration.
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Table 2
Absolute and Relative Contribution to the Growth
Rate of the Iranian Morey Stock by the Money Base
And the Monetary Ratios,(a} for Selected Periods 1961-1975
Period Average Absolute Contributions by
Growth Rate B C S RR RE G
of M per year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1961-1964 10.5 6.7 -0.2 -0.34 3.1 5.6 -0.3
1964-1967 12.6 13.6 1.0 -0.7 -2.9 0.8 -0.3
1967-1970 8.16 17.6 -0.2 -0.45 -3.3 0.4 -0.4
1970-1973 27.8 28.5 -0.04 -1.0 -0.1 0.5 -0.08
1973-1975 48.9 49.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.2 -0.7
Notes:
(a) Annual percentage rate of charge
(1) M = currency and demand deposit
(2) B = monetary base as defined in the text
(3) C = currency - money ratio
(4) S = Saving deposit - demand deposit ratio
(5) RR = legal reserve ratio
(6) RE = excessive reserve ratio
(7) G = government deposit - private demand deposit ratio
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Table 2 (continued)
Absolute and Relative Contribution to the Growth
Rate of the Iranian opey Stock by the Money Base
And the Monetary Ratios, a for Selected Periods 1961-1975
Total
of M
Change Relative Contributions in percent by
B C S RR RE
(b)
100 63.8 -1.9 -32.38 29.52 53.33 -2.85
107.93 7.93 -5.55 -23.01
215.68 -2.45 -55.14 -40.44
6.34 -2.38
4.90 -4.90
102.51 0.143 -3.59 -0.359 1.79 -0.287
101.22 0.204 0.163 1.02 -0.408 -1.43
Comment:
(b) Because of approximation errors the sum of the contributions
of the money base and the monetary ratios may not be equal to
the total change in money stock. This is true especially for
the period 1967-1970.
Period
1961-1964
100
G
1964-1967
1967-1970
1970-1973
1973-1975
100
100
100
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An important implication drawn from this phenomenon leads one to the
realization that the multiplier function has acted mostly as a
restraining element rather an expansionary element in the formation of
money supply in Iran. This is most visible during the time period
1967-1970 where the growth rate of money base exceeds that of the money
supply by more than 200 percent. This high rate of growth in money base
was mainly offset by a sharp increase in the legal reserve ratio and the
shift of private assets from demand deposits to saving and time
deposits. The legal reserve ratio increased from a value of .111 in 1967
to a value of .152 in 1970 resulting in an increase of about 136 percent
during these years. Also the increase in the saving-demand deposit was
very noticeable, from a value of 1.45 in 1967 to a high value of 2.44 in
1970.
It is interesting to note that this predominance of monetary base in
the process of money supply determination does not hold for all time
periods considered here. The time period 1961-1964 exhibits a pattern
which differs markedly from other time periods. During this time period,
the share of the rate of growth of money stock explained by the growth of
monetary base amounts only to 64 percent. This leaves about 36 percent
to be explained by the changes in the monetary ratios. Turning to Table
2 we realize that the expansionary task was mainly performed by the
banking sector. Both the legal and excess reserve ratios declined during
this period, therefore allowing the banks to expand credit to private and
public sector. This, once again, confirms the view that the banking
sector in Iran has been an effective channel through which the Central
Bank has controlled the supply of money.6
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3.3. Oil Revenue and the Monetary Base. An important conclusion
emerging from our inquiry into the sources of growth of the Iranian money
stock in th previous section was the significant contribution of the
monetary base to the growth of money stock. A better understanding of
the process of money supply determination in Iran, thus, necessitates the
knowledge of factors determining the growth rate of monetary base. In
this section of our study we undertake an examination of the determinants
of monetary base in Iran.
Table 3 reports our estimate of monetary base and its source
components for the Iranian economy for the period 1961 through 1975. An
important aspect of the supply of money base in Iran is the behavior of
foreign reserves. Its contribution to the supply of monetary base
fluctuates from a minimum value of -9 percent in 1970 to a maximum value
of 163 percent in 1974. Until 1967 it exhibits a rather stable pattern
contributing on the average 48 percent to the monetary base. This
stability is then disturbed by the shortage of foreign exchange in 1970
and by its abundance brought about by the oil price increase of October
1973.
The amount of bank borrowing from the Central Bank shows a
relatively stable pattern, contributing on the average about 17 percent
to the monetary base.
The government component of the monetary base which is in fact the
net claims of the Central Bank over the government, displays a trend
which is the mirror image of the foreign component. During the years
1974 and 1975 when the foreign reserves exceed the monetary base, the
government component is negative, implying that government deposits
exceed the stock of government securities held by the Central Bank.
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Table 3
The Sources of Money Base in Iran
Year Money Base External Sources
b. of R b. of R (%)
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
30.8
33.0
36.8
37.3
44.0
48.0
54.8
66.3
75.1
91.6
108.7
141.4
188.3
310.8
419.6
12.7
16.9
18.4
26.2
21.7
19.4
20.9
14.0
7.1
-8.8
29.6
70.3
142.7
508.1
506.6
(41)
(51)
(50)
(70)
(49)
(40)
(38)
(21)
(9)
(-9)
(27)
(49)
(75)
(163)
(121)
Government Comp. Bank Borrowing Others
b. of R. (%) b.of R (%) b.of R. (%)
15.8
14.9
16.6
7.8
23.1
29.3
41.0
54.3
67.6
101.5
84.4
82.4
51.9
-109.2
-40.3
(51)
(45)
(45)
(21)
(52)
(61)
(75)
(82)
(90)
(114)
(78)
(58)
(27)
(-35)
(-9)
4.8
4.5
5.1
10.1
8.7
11.2
7.6
11.2
15.0
15.3
14.5
20.6
45.2
38.1
99.6
(15)
(13)
(13)
(27)
(19)
(23)
(13)
(17)
(29)
(17)
(13)
(14)
(24)
(12)
(23)
-2.5
-3.3
-3.3
-6.8
-9.5
-11.9
-14.7
-13.2
-14.6
-16.4
-19.8
-31.9
-51.5
-126.1
-146.2
(-8)
(-10)
(-9)
(-18)
(-21)
(-24)
(-26)
(-20)
(-19)
(-18)
(-18)
(-22)
(-27)
(-40)
(-35)
Source: Central Bank of Iran Annual Report, various years. For exact
definitions of the components see the text.
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During these periods the Central Bank became a net debtor to the
government. This is indeed a reflection of the fact that oil revenue
affects both the domestic and external components of the money base. Any
changes in oil revenue will change the government revenues, thereby
changing the net position of the government with the Central Bank. At
the same time because oil revenues are received in foreign exchange this
will change the foreign reserves of the Central Bank as well.
To gain some insight into the exact way in which oil revenue affects
the monetary base we follow our theoretical arguments of Section 2. In
that section we derived an equation expressing the change in monetary
base as a function of oil revenue and the government expenditure.
Rewriting that equation, we have:
ABA = ( x- (1 - ) OR + (1 - ) (GEXP - NOR) + A-a (10.a)
According to this equation the effect of oil revenue on the change
in adjusted monetary base depends on the two parameters x and u . If X <
1 - then we expect the oil revenue to exert a negative impact on the
change in adjusted monetary base. Estimating equation (10.a) over the
period 1961-1975 produced the following results:7
A BA = -22.79 - .576 OR + .847 (GEXP - NOR)
(1.01) (2.29) (2.44)
R2 = .395, t - statistics are in the parenthesis. (10.b)
The estimates indicate that the oil revenue has a negative impact on
the changes in monetary base. This appears at first sight to be rather
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strange and therefore requires some explanation. To seek some reasons
behind this apparently paradoxical result we obtain the estimates of 
and . From equation (10.b) we obtain a value of .153 for and a
value of .271 for X . These estimates of X and ii appears to be quite
reasonable in light of equations (4) and (6). According to equation (6),
V can be interpreted as the proportion of the government deficit which
is financed by commercial and specialized banks, and due to the
underdeveloped stage of the government bonds market we expect to observe
a low value for p . Similarly from equation (4), can be interpreted
as the marginal impact of oil revenue on current account balance of
payments, and due to the significance of oil revenue in the determination
of the Iranian national income and high marginal propensity to imports in
Iran, we indeed expect a relatively low value for x . Some further
justification for this finding might be sought on the ground of
interpreting the negative influence of oil revenue on the change in
monetary base as an indication of the action of monetary authorities in
sterilizing the impact of foreign reserves in monetary base. To
illustrate this point of view further it is of interest to analyze more
precisely the behavior of the Iranian monetary authorities in their
attempt to offset the impact of foreign reserves on monetary base. An
estimate of the degree to which the monetary authorities adjust the
domestic component of monetary base to changes in the external component
can be obtained from the following regression analysis.
A(BA - FRC) = a1 + 2 A FRC (20)
A(B - FRC) = 1 + 2 A FRC (21)
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The coefficients a2 and 2 are the measures of the degree to which
the monetary authorities attempt to sterilize the impact of foreign
reserves on the adjusted monetary base and monetary base respectively. The
estimates of a2 and B2 are, thus, expected to be negative and significant
with the absolute value of 2 exceeding the absolute value of a2
Estimating these equations over the period 1961-1975, the results are:
A(BA - FRC) = 7.04 - .514 AFRC, R2 = .96 (20.a)
(2.43) (17.94)
A (B - FRC) = 17.64 - .713 AFRC, R2 = .86 (21.a)
(2.15) (8.76)
According to these estimates the Iranian monetary authorities on the
average adjust the domestic component of the monetary base by about 71
rials and the domestic component of the adjusted monetary base by about
51 rials out of each 100-rial change in foreign reserves. These results
clearly indicate that the Iranian monetary authorities have been
relatively successful in sterilizing the movements in foreign reserves on
the domestic component of monetary base.7 In this regard, however, it
is to be noted that part of the negative impact of the variation in
foreign reserve on domestic component of monetary base can be attributed
to the fact that the oil revenue, by nature, affects the domestic and
external components of the monetary base adversely. As already
indicated, any increase in the oil revenue increases the foreign reserves
held by the Central Bank, while at the same time, given the level of
government expenditure, it is more likely to decrease the claims of
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Central Bank over the government. This automatic process of
sterilization policy in Iran is of utmost importance in understanding the
nature and the mechanism of monetary policy in Iran. However, it cannot
be denied that the conscious actions of the Central Bank mainly through
the exercise of its control over the commercial banks, such as changes in
legal reserves requirements, changes in advance and discounts to the
banks and so on, have been quite effective in offsetting the movements of
foreign reserves on the domestic component of monetary base.8 The
higher estimate obtained
for 2 than for a2 in equation (20.a) and (21.a) clearly attests to the
truth in this statement. As can be shown, the difference in the estimates
of 2 and a 2 is mainly due to the fact that the amount of banks'
borrowing is included in the definitions of monetary base, while it is
excluded in the definitions of the adjusted monetary base.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper we carried out an investigation of the process of
money supply determination in Iran, and tried to see to what extent the
Central Bank has been able to control the stock of money. By analyzing
the sources of growth of money supply for the period 1961-1975 we came to
the realization that the growth of monetary base contributed
significantly to the growth of money supply, accounting on the average
for about 118 percent. This then led us to an interesting conclusion
regarding the role of the multiplier function in the formation of money
supply in Iran, namely, that it has acted mostly as an restraining rather
than expansionary element.
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Our empirical analysis of the supply of monetary base in Iran
indicated that the oil revenue had a negative and significant and the
government expenditure a positive and significant impact on the change in
money base. This, indeed, pointed to a distinguishing feature of the
process of money base determination in Iran or any other OPEC country.
Due to the fact that the oil revenue accrues directly to the government
and is paid in foreign exchange, it affects both the internal and
external components of monetary base. This dual feature of oil revenue
results in a partial automatic sterilization of foreign reserves. The
autonomous and total sterilization coefficients were estimated to be .51
and .71 respectively.
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APPENDIX I
Derivation of Monetary Base
Writing the asset side of the Central Bank's balance sheet we have:
Asset side = FAC + GAC + BAC + OAC (A.1)
The liability side can be written as:
Liability side = CRP + CRB + BLLC + BLSC +
GLC + FLC + TMLC + GLC1 +
MLC + KAC (A.2)
From the identy (A.1) = (A.2) and by transferring the terms, FLC,
GLC, GLC1 , MLC, KAC, and IMLC from the liability side to the asset side we
have:
B = (FAC - FLC) + (GAC - GLC - GLC1) + (OAC - MLC - KAC - IMLC + BAC
(A.3)
where the terms in parentheses represent the net position of the Central
Bank with the government and with the foreigners. Rewriting it we have:
B = FRC + GNAC + BAC + EAC (A.4)
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APPENDIX II
Alphabetical List of Variables
B Monetary base
BA Adjusted monetary base
BAC Liability of banks to Central Bank
BAG Government's deposits with the banks
BLLC Legal deposits of banks with Central Bank
BLG Government securities in the hands of commercial and specialized
banks
BLSC Sight deposits of banks with Central Bank
C Currency-money ratio
CAB Current account balance of payment
CRB Currency holding of banks
CRP Currency in the hand of non-bank public
DD Demand deposits
EAC Exogenous terms in the asset side of the balance sheet of
Central Bank.
ERB Excessive reserve of banks
FAB Foreign assets of banks
FAC Foreign assets of Central Bank
FAG Foreign assets of government
FLB Foreign liability of banks
FLC Foreicn liability of Central Bank
FLG Foreign liability of Central Bank
FRC Net foreign assets of Central Bank
GAC Government securities in the hands of Central Bank
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APPENDIX II
(continued)
GD Government deposits with the banks
GDF Government deficit
GEXP Government expenditures
GLC1 Advance payment on letters of credit of the government sector
GNAC Net claims of Central Bank over Government
IMLC Import registration deposits of the private sector
KAC Capital account of Central Bank
LRB Required reserve of banks with Central Bank
M Money multiplier
M1 Money stock
MLC Miscellaneous terms on the liability side of the Central Bank's
balance sheet
NOR Non-oil revenue of the government
OAC Customers' understandings re credits, guarantees and acceptance
OR Oil revenue
RE Extensive reserve ratio of banks
RR Required reserve ratio of banks
S Saving and time deposits - demand deposits of banks
SD Saving and time deposits
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NOTES
1. See for example Fried and Schultze (1975) for a collection of papers
on the impact of oil price increase of late 1973 on industrial
countries.
2. This is indeed a distinguishing feature of OPEC economies from other
open economies where the private sector is the main receipient of
export earnings in the form of foreign currency. In this case and
under the system of fixed exchange rates, any change in the foreign
assets of the Central Bank - in the absence of any sterilization
policy - has a direct and equal impact on the supply of bank
reserves and hence on the supply of money. See for example Brunner
(1973) and Herring and Marston (1977a, 1977b) for a discussion of
this point. However, in the case of OPEC economies where the
government is the main recipient of export earnings such a direct
link between the change in the foreign reserves of the Central Bank
and the change in money supply does not exist. This point has been
noted by McNown and Wallace (1977) as well.
3. Our concept of monetary base for the Iranian economy is essentially
close to the one adopted by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
for the United State's economy. For a discussion concerning the
definition of monetary base and its empirical measurement see
Anderson and Jordan (1968), Jordan (1969) and Balbach and Burger
(1976).
4. In studies by Cagan (1965) for US by Jonung (1976) for Sweeden and
by Thygesen (1971) for Denmark, it was also found that the growth of
money base contributed significantly to the growth of money supply.
For example it was found that the growth in the money base
contributed about 81 percent to the growth in the money stock during
the period 1946-1971 in Sweeden and by about 91 percent during the
period 1875-1955 in the United States.
5. To see more clearly how much control the Central Bank has exercised
over the banks we have expressed money-multiplier as a function of
monetary ratios. Estimating this equation by OLS we found
A m = .704 - .586 c - 1.73 RR - 2.41 RE
m
(.62) (.79) (3.64) (4.4)
-.167 S - .127 G
(2.3) (1.55) R2 = .908
From this equation we realize that the most significant variable in
determing the growth rate of money-multiplier is the change in
excess reserve ratio of the banks. Second to this is the change in legal
reserve ratio of the banks.
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6. We used OLS for estimating all the equations reported in this paper.
7. By estimating a similar equation as (21) Williams (1971) obtained an
estimate of - .86 for Germany. This indicates that the German
monetary authorities have been more successful in neutralizing the
impact of foreign reserves on change in money base than Iranian
monetary authorities.
8. From the estimates of equations (19) and (20) the coefficient of the
"exogenous" sterilization policy of Central Bank can be estimated to
be .2. This is the difference between 2 and a2 '
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